Tag: 22. Mai 2026

This is about the interconnectedness of myth and enlightenment

Myth, folktales, and legends are
sometimes treated as indistinguishable from one another
(c. t. Kirk 1970 p. 31). It seems, therefore, prudent to
shortly and broadly highlight some of the distinguishable
qualities of the three to arrive at a more general definition
of myth itself. Folktales can be understood as fictional
narratives that lack religious context and often convey
practical lessons or moral insights and are not situated
within any specific time or location (c. t. Masse et. al. 2007
p. 09-10).
Legends, on the other hand, can be considered to be
semi-historical narratives that are regarded as true by the
cultures from which they emerge and serve to reinforce
local customs, narrate the migrations of peoples, and
chronicle the accomplishments of heroes (c. t. ibid.). They
often blend realistic elements with supernatural and
mythical features (c. t. ibid).
Finally, myths represent cultural narratives pertaining to
significant events believed to have transpired in the
distant past, at a time when the world diverged markedly
from contemporary existence and are viewed as factual
by the traditional custodians of knowledge who preserve
and transmit them, and they often carry profound sacred
significance or are imbued with robust religious and
ritualistic elements (c. t. ibid.). Myths often utilize
supernatural figures, for example, gods, demigods, etc.,
and elements of what is commonly referred to as one’s
‚worldview.‘ (c. t. ibid.). To be applicable here, one needs
to acknowledge that there is some overlap between the
narrative structure of myth and legend and focus on the
time frame as the distinguishing feature. Legends seem to
have transpired in the not-so-distant past, and myths in
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the distant past. This would disqualify them as an
analytical lens for the topic of this paper. On the other
hand, if one focuses on the other criteria namely that
legends are regarded as true by the cultures from which
they emerge and serve to reinforce local customs, narrate
the
migrations of peoples, and chronicle the
accomplishments of heroes (c. t. ibid.). Furthermore, if
one acknowledges that myths take place in settings
markedly divergent from contemporary existence and are
regarded as factual by traditional custodians of
knowledge who preserve and transmit them and
moreover that they frequently carry profound sacred
significance and are imbued with robust religious and
ritualistic elements (c. t. ibid.). One may acknowledge the
wider applicability of myth as an analytical lens beyond
the presented timeframe as the main criterion (c. t. ibid.).
The etymological concept of myth or mythos can,
however, also be dated back to ancient Greece and
denoted an authentic narrative that revealed the genuine
origins of both the world and humanity (c. t. Partenie 2022
Intro.). Generally speaking, a myth can also be framed or
understood as a widespread, popular, false belief (c. t.
ibid.). Now, with this latter definition, one would have
definitive criteria to work with, this definition is not quite
adequate for the context of this paper. One of the reasons
for this is that the work of the philosopher Albert Camus
famously features the myth of Sisyphus more or less in the
role of an authentic narrative that revealed the genuine
origins of both the world and humanity (c. t. f. e. Aronson
2021 Intro.). The idea of authenticity should be
decoupled from the idea of fact in this case, and if I narrow
in on the function of the myth, we seem to have in all cases
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a tale, which focuses on the spiritual, philosophical, and
metaphysical existence or origin of both the world and
humanity. And in the case of Camus, we have a myth that
is primarily used in a metaphorical fashion to discuss the
plight and existence of humankind, but not as a factually
true tale that is nonetheless assigned a particular kind of
explanatory function.
The central argument I intend to present is that myths‘
distinctive explanatory function is not inherently
contingent upon their factual accuracy. This is, of course,
acknowledging myths as fulfilling mostly a symbolic or
metaphorical function in order to communicate deeper
meaning. To summarize I would like to define myths
therefore as an authentic narrative that reveals something
about the genuine origins or existence of both the world
and humanity and that take place in a setting that diverges
markedly from contemporary existence and are viewed as
factual by the traditional custodians of knowledge who
preserve and transmit them. They also often carry
profound sacred significance or are imbued with robust
religious and ritualistic elements.

If one tends to view Enlightenment as the advancement of
knowledge designed to promote the mastery of humans
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over the world in general, one would necessarily find the
idea of Enlightenment as a mythos to be a fundamental
oxymoron (c. t. Adorno & Horkheimer 2002, p. 01). As
such, it has been the declared goal of the movement of
the Enlightenment to dispel myths and replace them with
knowledge (c. t. ibid.). This can be rooted in the human
desire to eradicate the unknown through knowledge and
with it fear because what is known does not need to be
feared (c. t. ibid. p. 11). Therefore, nothing should be
excluded from the pursuit of knowledge since the mere
idea of something being excluded from the scope of
knowledge is, following this line of argument, a source of
fear (c. t. ibid.). This fear of not knowing something or
admitting that some things cannot be known can be
called the ultimate taboo because of the all
encompassing nature of this idea (c. t. ibid.). This is
necessarily opposed to the idea of a world based on a
cyclical nature and on equivalent exchange (c. t. ibid. p.
11-12). The idea of a cyclical world based on equivalent
exchange is also fundamentally opposed to the idea of
free will since everything is ultimately governed by fate, or
in other words, fundamental law (c. t. ibid.). One can find
this image personified in the image or likeness of the
goddess Justicia, which is usually depicted with a
blindfold in order to render accurate judgment (c. t. ibid.
p. 12). This is equivalent to the symbolized by Justicias scales as the absolute measure of the law, contradicting the idea of freedom and free choice in general, since one is not looked upon (c. t. ibid.). Sign and image were in general to be considered to be one unit, but in the process of Enlightenment or science in general this unity was fractured and essentially reduced to numbers in the Seite 16 von 82 form of mathematics, which of course renounces all claims of resembling the world it is trying to depict as opposed to for example ancient Egyptian hieroglyphics ( c. t. ibid. p. 12-13). This also translates to a seclusion of the sciences from the arts since the arts tend to claim a secluded, special sphere outside of the profane for themselves (c. t. ibid. p. 14). Contrary to this, religion or faith is normally allowed by the principles of the Enlightenment as long as it is relegated to the private and transparent about its opposition to knowledge (c. t. ibid.). Enlightenment can be considered to be generally opposed not only to symbols, but also to universal concepts and metaphysics in general (c. t. ibid. p. 17). On the other hand, as Horkheimer and Adorno work out in their Dialectic of Enlightenment, one is faced with a general contradiction in which the achieved mastery of humans over the world in general turns against humans as thinking individuals themselves (c. t. ibid. p. 20). Since the domination of all things by logical formalism, reason is brought down to the immediate as the only valid point of origin (c. t. ibid.). Since, as established before, essentially all possible higher meanings of the symbolic and metaphysical nature are excluded by the ideal of the Enlightenment. This objectification or othering of all things necessarily leads to an objectification of thinking individuals themselves, because one is reduced to the scripted or conventional reactions and the accompanying modes of presumed operations (c. t. ibid. p. 21). This fundamental reduction stems ultimately from the idea of self-preservation and the resulting adaptability as the ultimate core value of the worldview of the Enlightenment (c. t. ibid. p. 21-22). The problematic nature of this reduction becomes apparent if Seite 17 von 82 one acknowledges that self-preservation ultimately can only be expressed as functions and necessarily eliminates the self in the process (c. t. ibid. p. 43). Horkheimer and Adorno hereby expose the self-destructive and conflicting nature of the Enlightenment and reference over the course of their discourse the myth of the Odyssey and distinguish Enlightenment from myth and epic (c. t. ibid. p. 37). Essentially, Horkheimer and Adorno fundamentally juxtapose myth and Enlightenment as two separate modes of operating with the world (c. t. f. e. ibid. p. 61). The following analysis will show that these phenomena are more similar to each other than previously recognized. As previously established, myth can be defined as an authentic narrative that reveals something about the genuine origins or existence of both the world and humanity and that takes place in a setting that diverges markedly from contemporary existence. Thia narrative is viewed as factual by the traditional custodians of knowledge who preserve and transmit it, and myths often carry profound sacred significance or are imbued with robust religious and ritualistic elements. To reiterate it should also be noted that time should not be the predominant factor in what should be or should not be called myth. With this definition in mind, one can see the Odyssey as a mythical text that, according to Adorno and Horkheimer, at least incorporates mythical elements and takes place in the distant past, even by the time it was written (c. t. f. e. ibid. p. 61-62). If I use the previously established working definition for simplicitys sake, it
seems very much applicable not only to the Odyssey but
also
to
the
concept of Enlightenment itself.
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Enlightenment, as presented through Horkheimer and
Adorno, establishes the world as something knowable
that can be solved through reason and reduces
everything to the abstract for this sake, and finally has a
certain self-destroying character through this process.
Enlightenment, by this definition, reveals something
about the genuine origins and existence of both the world
and human existence in general. This point seems to be
definitely applicable by nature of most adherents and also
critiques of the Enlightenment, granting or prescribing
this to the Enlightenment. The idea of Enlightenment
taking place in a setting that diverges markedly from
contemporary existence is a bit more difficult to apply and
admittedly is a bit of a stretch. Enlightenment usually
applies to the realm or setting of science in all its forms,
which are not part of everyday life. The question therefore
should be whether applying the definition in this way
deprives it of meaning, since every realm that follows
different rules and conventions from the regular everyday
life of most people could reasonably make the same
claim. Science usually takes place in the context of a
university and scholarship, which can generally be
classified as a setting that is not readily available to the
general public, and which follows its own rules that are
not upheld by most people. Similarly, the military is an
institution separated from every day life, that follows its
own rules. What is known of military life, is usually not
viewed as factual by the traditional custodians of
knowledge who preserve and transmit it. This is different
for the scientific community whose traditional custodians
would to some degree argue for the factuality of most of
the results that modern science produces.
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For the last part of the definition to be applicable, I would
like to examine the term ritual through a cultural
anthropological framework. I chose this framework since
the field of cultural anthropology is uniquely suited for
addressing the phenomenon, since it analyzes the
everyday and the religious mainly through qualitative
methodology. Considering the etymological origins of
the word, ritual can be derived from the Latin word “ritus”,
which translates to religious implementation hand (c. t.
Uhlig 2020, p. 438). With this basic definition, one would
find the concept of ritual inapplicable to the subject at
hand. However, cultural anthropology has emancipated
itself to a certain degree from this notion and primarily
distinguishes between ritual and routine (c. t. ibid. p. 438
439). Routines are thereby defined as acts performed in
everyday life, thus providing structure, such as, for
example, lighting a cigarette after getting out of bed,
taking a shower in the evening before going to bed to
calm oneself, etc. (c. t. ibid. p. 439). The purposes of
routines are most of the time self-evident and can be
ascertained from watching the person who is performing
them (c. t. ibid. p. 440). A practical example of this would
be a craftsman, working with their tools to perform the
same routine tasks as their colleagues in practiced unison
(c. t. ibid.). However, such tasks can on a regular basis
involve the assigning of purpose to the required tools,
which sometimes at least borders on the symbolic (c. t.
ibid.). As such, the term ritual might seem more
applicable, and it has indeed been applied to them in this
fashion by the science of cultural anthropology. To be
more precise: The term has been applied to a much wider
spectrum of tasks outside of the religious domain in the
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form of secular group activities (c. t. ibid.). Secular actions
and rituals covered by this term are, for example, birthday
parties, prom, and other celebrations of achievement (c.
t. ibid.). Of particular importance to apply this term is the
idea that there must be a sacrosanct dimension, applied
by the one performing or doing it, to the performed task,
which forbids unwanted interference and changes (c. t.
ibid. p. 440-441). In other words, a sort of ceremonial
practice has to be associated with or prescribed to the
task by the people performing it (c. t. ibid. p. 452).
I think this view applies to science to a certain degree or
at least scientists performing for example lab work in an
almost ceremonial matter and are of course doing so
usually to achieve insight in their field of study in a
particular matter and some of some might even just do
certain tasks because they think they are required, but do
not quite understands why they are necessary. Now, of
course, this is talking about science and not the
Enlightenment, but as previously established, science is
usually the realm where the principles of the
Enlightenment are at least to a certain degree applied
and adhered to. The presented argument allows the
application of the established idea of myth to the concept
of Enlightenment. This should not be misconstrued as me
arguing for science in general as a myth, but merely be
seen as an argument that postulates that the principles of
the Enlightenment that lie under and inform scientific
practice can be called mythical. This merely emphasizes
the idea that scientific practice relies on some of the
assumptions of Enlightenment, which cannot be proven
at this point in time and are as Horkheimer and Adorno
have demonstrated worthy of critique because of their
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unintended side effects and are yet upheld by some as
the truth with the same unshakeable certainty that should
only come from a theory , which is well proven by scientific
means through experiment and careful observation.

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